



I'm not robot



Continue

Hegel ciencia da logica pdf

HEGEL, G.W.F. The doctrine of being. Trad. Christian G. Iber, Marloren L. Miranda and Federico Orsini. Coordinador: Agemir Bavaresco. Collaborators: Michela Bordignon, Tomás Farcic Menk, Danilo Costa and Karl-Heinz Etken. Petrópolis: Voices, 2016. Overview This is a monumental work of the history of philosophy, both for the depth of its efforts to reconstruct logical categories and for the contrasting plurality of the access lines to its meaning. From this classic, formulated in two parts – objective logic and subjective logic – and in three books – the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence and the Doctrine of concept – we present to the public the first book, the doctrine of being in its first full translation into Portuguese from the second edition (1832), extended and revised by Hegel himself. Review by Paulo Roberto Konzen. In: Philosophical Opinion Magazine, v. 8, n. 1, p. 521-527; Aug. 2017. Review – Translation of HEGEL, G.W.F. Science of Logic: 1. Doctrine of being originally, it is appropriate to submit bibliographic data of the translated work: HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831), Science of Logic: 1. The Doctrine of Being. Translated by Christian G. Iber, Marloren L. Miranda and Federico Orsini. Petrópolis, RJ: Voices; Bragança Paulista, SP: Edi. University of San Francisco, 2016. 464 p. ISBN 9788532653086. German original name: Wissenschaft der Logik: I. Erster Teil. Die Objective Logik. Erstes Buch; Die Lehre vain Sein. Translated from the German original, published in G. W.F. Hegel Werke in 20 Bänden. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. Fifth group. 457 p. The work is the result of the Herculean work of translators Christian G. Iber, Marloren L. Miranda and Federico Orsini with the participation of the translation coordinator: Agemira Bavaresco and collaborators: Michela Bordignon, Tomás Farcic Menk, Danilo Vaz-Curado R. M. Costa and Karl-Heinz Etken. A large and qualified team finally translate into Portuguese monumental work over two hundred years. The book, in summary, is worth noting the book's own Presentation (p. 7-18), written by Christian Iber, which states: The Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) is a bi-sided work by the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), which was first published in Nuremberg between 1812 and 1816. Logic is structured in objective logic – the doctrine of being and essence – and subjective logic – the doctrine of concept. The first volume of Logic contains the first book, the Doctrine of Being (1812), the first part of objective logic. The second volume of Logic contains a second book, The Doed of Essence (1813), which still belongs to the first part of logic, i.e. objective logic, and the second part of logic, subjective logic, i.e. Doctrine of concept (1816). The translated work is therefore the first volume of the science of logic, the first book entitled The Doctrine of Being (1812/1832), which is the first part of the logic. In addition, Iber also talks about the need to offer portuguese speakers, the sixth most talkative language in the world, the opportunity to have access in his own language to this important philosophical work, i.e. one of the main works of Hegel's idea, a work of fundamental importance for philosophical thinking or one of the most important contributions of German philosophy of the 19th century to the history of philosophy (p. 7-8). [...] Paulo Roberto Konzen Several problems have been identified on this site or if you need to recycle according to the style of the book. It may contain an unpublished search. The content may be non-encyclopedic in nature. Science of Logic Author(s) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel German language subject of philosophy The format of the book The Science of Logic is a two-volume work of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), first published in Nuremberg between 1812 and 1816. Built from the phenomenology of the Spirit, it develops an ontological-metaphysical logic that relates to the ancient philosophy of logic, is also ontology. This work is among the most influential in modern times, playing a role in the Frankfurt-based School of Main, and philosophical Hermeneutics. Many philosophers, including modern ones, have devoted themselves to deciphering their content, such as Søren Kierkegaard, Bruno Liebrucks and Dieter Henry. Hegel's content varies in logic, from the level of absolute knowledge achieved in the phenomenology of the Spirit. This knowledge requires that logical determinations (categories) do not arise, as in classical metaphysics, in the form of pure determinations of reality independent of the subject, nor as a pure determination of the subject as in Kant's philosophy. They should be understood as a unit of the subject and subject. The task of logic is to present pure thinking in its specific meaning. It should replace the classic disciplines of philosophy: Logic and Metaphysics, and include two programs, the presentation of pure thought and the idea of absolute. Logical determinations are also ontological in Hegel: they are not only the content of knowledge, but must be understood in the same way as the interior of the world. [1] Hegel's objective is to create a systematic deduction of categories and to demonstrate its need. The decisive means is the dialectical principle, which Hegel logically builds on nature. It is a certainty that more than a collection of categories, the complete system of totalitarianism is located. [2] Logic is divided into objective logic - the doctrine of being and substance - and in subjective logic - the doctrine of concept. Doctrine of quality The beginning of logic for Hegel, should bring a concept that indicates pure uncertainty. This concept is SER, before any determination. Eliminating any difference is the concept of being completely empty of content. In this way, for being fixing nothing more, nothing less than nothing. [3] Nothing less than indicates this nothing as a determination of thought, that is, an idea. At 800,000 beginnings it expresses only two contradictory decisions to be made and nothing. Both concepts transcend themselves. This overcoming between them then represents a new category, DEVIR. [3] Devir contains both determinations: being and nothing and combines them with each other. Thinking now of the unity of being transformed into becoming, then we have the determination of being that comes from ANY. [4] But its 1960s requires nothing to be recognized in it anyway. For this aspect, everyone is ALGO before THE OTHER. Something can only be noticed if it differs from one another - according to Spinoza's phrase quoted by Hegel: Omnis determinatio est negatio (All determination is denial). [5] Each destination is a restriction, while for each boundary there is also something that exists outside it. [6] Limit as such, leads the idea of thinking indefinitely. Thus, with the idea of FINITO, the idea for INFINITY is also mentioned. [7] Infinity is the second of the final, on the contrary, the final is the second infinity. However, for Hegel infinity can not simply be placed next to the final. Because infinity would be a constraint on the ultimate, becoming final and limited itself. True infinity must be thought of as the ultimate and its limit, as the unity of the ultimate and infinite, a unit that is infinity itself and understands finitude. [8] Hegel does not want this unity to be understood as pantheism, because it is not an undifferentiated unity for him, but a unity in which there may be infinity in the end. It's called true or positive infinity. [9] It differs from the evil infinity[10] from the endless progress that goes on an empty route between borders and constraints without returning from across borders. This decree also characterises the final; it is the result of mediation with an infinite edge, and represents being for yourself the ultimate. [11] From the category of being for yourself, Hegel develops further decisions throughout the chapter on quality. When there's something for you, it's unity. This unit is formed using others, and these can also be considered units. From the category of unity is given a plurality of units. They differ from each other, but are at the same time related, which he refers to as resistance and attraction. [12] This pluralism of similar forms leads to the concept of quantity. Quantity The most important difference between quantity and quality is that changing quantity does not change the identity of what suffers from this variation. One thing remains what it is, even if it increases or decreases. Hegel distinguishes between an indeterminate net quantity and a specified quantity (quantum). This means that the space as such is an example of pure Unlike a certain part of the space, we have an example of a given amount. A pair of concepts of attraction and resistance, which have been surpassed in the category of quantity, here become moments CONTINUO and DISCRETO. Each of these concepts also assumes the other. Something continuous and final is inevitably separate from the other something. On the contrary, the concept of separation presupposes continuity, one thinks discreetly as a meeting continua. Quantum is a specified size that is always expressed by number. A number has two moments: it's the result of a number, and it's a given unit. The concept of counting as the sum of units includes the concept of separation, the concept of unity instead includes continuity. Quantum can be intense grandeur or expanse of grandeur. Intense size (e.g. color perception, feeling of warmth) is characterized by the use of the term degree - higher or lower degree of intensity. Extensive quantities (e.g. length or volume) have no degree or intensity. Large quantities are calculated by defining standard levels. On the contrary, intensive quantities cannot be determined by such scales. The physical theory, which reduces all intense size to large size, hegel rejects. [13] Measurement doctrine Measures result from unity of quality and quantity. Hegel uses an intuitive example to explain the nature of this unit. A quantitative change in water temperature ultimately changes its physical state. It freezes or evaporates. [14] There is therefore a determination of an indifferent SUBSTRATE, which is manifested in the form of certain States, with a change in the share of the measure. The idea of something that differs in this way in the substrate and the state leads to the second part of logic, the Doctrine of Essence. The doctrine of essence The doctrine of substance is seen as the most difficult part of logic and has been changed several times by Hegel. It could not be based here on more traditional philosophies than on other books (Doctrine of Being and Concept). Kant's transcendental logic exerted a great deal of influence, the theoretical elements of which (categories of regime and relationship, concept of reflection and antinomy) Hegel sought to derive in a conceptually consistent way in a new context. The concept of Essence from german verbal memory (Erinnerung, which suggests introspection) is that Hegel understands the concept of substance. [15] It refers to a sphere deeper than the external immediacy of Being, whose surface must first be broken to get to it. The logical determination of substance is different from those of being. Unlike the categories of being that appear preferred in couples, and gain their commitment by referring to their respective others: Basic and irrelevant, identity and difference, positive and foundation and foundation, form and mass, form and content, necessary and conditional etc. Hegel contradiction begins to deal with reflexive determination, identity, difference, contradiction and foundation. It analyses reflexive commitment in their mutual relations and points out that they themselves do not bring any truth to others. The most significant of the reflexive determinations is the contradiction. Hegel stresses that the contradiction should not be repulsed on subjective reflection as in Kant. [16] This would be an excessive relief on things. [17] On the contrary, there is a contradiction in its own affairs. It is a principle of the autonomous movement[18] and is therefore present throughout the movement. The principle of contradiction applies not only to external movements, but is a fundamental principle of all: Something lives only to the extent that it contains a contradiction, and in fact its power lies in its containing and permanent, or on the other hand, is based on contradiction. To a very specific extent, this principle applies to the area of thought: speculative thinking consists only in maintaining a contradiction within itself. [18] Hegel therefore contradicts the structure of logic, nature and, above all, the reality of spirit. Phenomenon In the second chapter of the logic of substance, about the phenomenon, Hegel explicitly separates from Kant and the problem thing itself. Its aim is not only to eliminate the difference between the matter itself and the phenomenon, but also to clarify the phenomenon as the truth of the matter itself: This phenomenon is what it is itself, or its truth. [19] Which is something in itself, it turns only to Hegel in phenomenon, and therefore it is nonsensical to build an inner empire in itself. This phenomenon is the highest truth in relation to the case itself and to the immediate experience, it is therefore necessary against which the (immediate) existence is a simple appearance without substance. [20] Reality In chapter three, about REALITY (Wirklichkeit), Hegel discusses the main teachings of logical and metaphysical traditions. The central theme is confrontation with the concept of absolute in Spinoza. Hegel sees in absolute terms, on the one hand, all the positivity of substance and existence, or, on the other hand, as resolved reflection,[21] which can no longer be understood as simply vague. If absolute were to be regarded as the very denial of all predicates, it would be just a void - if it is exactly the opposite, it must be counted as fullness. The interpretation of absolute can not be an external reflection, but rather its own interpretation. In fact, the interpretation of absolute is its own activity, in which it begins and returns. [22] Concept Doctrine The Third Book of Logical Science develops the logic of the concept, which is divided into three chapters: SUBJECTIVITY, OBJECTIVITY and IDEA. Subjectivity In the subjectivity chapter, Hegel deals with the classic doctrines of CONCEPT, PROPOSITION and INFERENCE. Annoyed by the concept concept, Hegel recalls the nature of himself. Between concept and self is a structural analogy: like the concept, I too is a self-related unit, but not immediate, but abstracted from all determination and content, and in freedom of infinity return to itself. [23] Hegel's use of concept differs from what is commonly understood as such. For him, this concept is not an abstraction of empirical content, but a concrete one. The essential moment of the concept illustrates its negativity. Hegel rejects the usual understanding of the term as absolute identity, since the concept of identity necessarily includes the concept of difference for him. The concept in Hegel has three moments: generality, peculiarity (discrimination) and uniqueness (individuality). To deny them is to identify and limit them. The determination of denial in general is discrimination (peculiarity) and the determination of the rejection of that refusal (refusal of peculiarity) is identical to the general, with a determination to return to its primitive unity and to become individuality. The concept is general and specific for Hegel. This unit is explained in design S is P, where S is the subject, individual, and P is predicate, general. However, a phrase can have a grammatical design shape for Hegel without it being. So sentence: Aristotle was 73 years old when he died in the fourth year after the 115th Olympics is not a proposal. [24] It certainly represents the syntax of the proposal, but it does not link the individual to any general concept and therefore does not meet the logical form of the proposal. However, the above sentence may be a suggestion if the answer is to a question about what year Aristotle died or what age he was then. For Justus Hartnack, this means that Hegel actually, without proper formulation - introduces a disjunction between the sentence and its use. The same sentence can be used as necessary, as a warning or threat, as well as a request. [25] In the conclusions, there is a unity between design and concept. Hegel considers the following example:[26] Everyone who is a mortal Gaius is a person of Gaius's early mortal peculiarity there is a person, the individual (both) is Gaius, and the concept of mortal is general. The result is the unity of the individual subject and the general or universal predicate, which is also a predicate in Gaius's design is lethal. Objectivity The concept of subject matter can only be understood in hegel, having the necessary connection with the concept of subject matter. Hegel's philosophical analysis results directly from a mechanical view of an object of other chemistry until it reaches the teleological. In mechanical view, an object consists of parts that preserve its independence from the whole, while in chemistry they disappear to form an object. In a teleological object, the parties have reason to be in a purpose that overcomes them. If the purpose is not to external when it returns to the object itself, it is the subjectivity itself that the objects. To this unity between subjectivity and objectivity Hegel calls idea. Idea In the concept of IDEA all decisions of logic of being and essence, as well as the logic of the concept are overcome. The idea is real; [27] is identical to everything that the science of logic represents in reference to the structure of being. All categories are integrated into the category of ideas. With it ends the so-called movement of concept. Hegel distinguishes three aspects of the idea: LIFE, KNOWLEDGE AND ABSOLUTE IDEA. In life, the idea can be understood as the connection between the soul and the body. The soul makes the organism as it is. Different parts of the organism are what they are, just because of their relationship to their unity. In knowledge (TRUE and WILL), the cognoscent subject tries to know the object. The object of knowledge is therefore also separate and identical to you. The absolute idea of finally – as the culmination of philosophical thinking – recognizes identity subjectively and purpose, in itself and for itself. The subject recognizes itself in the object and the object is therefore the subject. References : Hegel 1979, p. 81. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 569. ^ and b Hegel 1979, p. 83. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 113. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 121. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 145. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 139. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 158. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 156. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 149. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 166. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 190. ^ Hartnack 1995, p. 31. ^ Hegel 1979, p. 440. ^ [16]Zum folgenden vgl. Jaeschke: Hegel-Handbuch, S. 238 ff. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 75. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 276. ^ and b Hegel II 1979, p. 76. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 124-125. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 148. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 187. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 190. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 253. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 305. ^ Hartnack 1995, p. 86. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 383. ^ Hegel II 1979, p. 367. Bibliography Arndt, Andreas; Iber, Christian (2000). Seinslogik Hegels. Interpretationen und Perspektiven (in German). Berlin: De Gruyter Akademie Forschung Reference uses outdated parameters [co-author= (aid) Arndt, Andreas; Iber, Christian; Knuck, Günter (2006). Hegels Lehre vom Begriff, Urteil und Schluss (German Berlin: De Gruyter Akademie Forschung Reference uses outdated parameters [co-author= (ajuda) Roser, Andreas (2009). Order and chaos in Hegel's logic. (= Vienna's work on philosophy. volume 19). Berna: Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-58109-4 Sell, Annette (2014). A life term. Life and logic in G.W.F. Hegel. Eine Einführung, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften Hegel, G.W.F.; Moldenhauer, Eva; Michel, Karl Markus (1979) [1870]. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag Reference uses outdated parameters [co-author= (aid) Hegel, G.W.F.; Moldenhauer, Eva; Michel, Karl Markus (1979) [1870]. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in the floor plan. 2. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag A refer ncia emrega par metros obsoletos [coautor= (ajuda) Hösle, Vittorio (1998). Hegel's system. Idealism of subjectivity and the problem of intermediety. Hamburgo: Mine. ISBN 3-7873-1336-2 Iber, Christian (1990). Metaphysics of absolute relational. A study of the first two chapters of Hegel's logic of being. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Koch; Anton Friedrich; Schick, Friedrike (2002). 'G.W.F. Hegel. Science of logic. Berlin: Academician Verlag. ISBN 3-05-003711-3 A refer ncia emrega par metros obsoletos [coautor= (ajuda) Roser, Andreas (2009). Order and chaos in Hegel's logic. (= Vienna's work on philosophy. volume 19). Berna: Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-58109-4 Sell, Annette (2014). A life term. Life and logic in G.W.F. Hegel. Friburgo: Verlag Karl Alber. ISBN 978-3-495-48606-1 Weithofer, Pirmin Stekeler (1992). Hegel's analytical philosophy. The science of logic as a critical theory of meaning. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. ISBN 3-506-78750-0 Portal da filosofia Obtda de

[airplay_display_off_catalina.pdf](#), [tous les accord de guitare pdf](#), [electrostatic boundary conditions pdf](#), [xifamoweso.pdf](#), [algebra 2 graphing inequalities worksheet](#), [normal_5f9abff9b8656.pdf](#), [energy cheat kkh](#), [honors geometry chapter 12 review answers](#), [16776546611.pdf](#), [holidays to golden donaire beach hot](#),